The Austrian calculation argument suggests that inability to engage in economic calculation worsened outcomes in socialist states. We suggest that this is hardly the case. When Austrian assumptions of benevolence are relaxed, inability to engage in economic calculation prevents the non-benevolent planner from fully extracting all available surplus from the citizenry. Consequently, when planners are non-benevolent, calculation ceases to be a relevant argument against the desirability of central planning; its normative force reverses absent benevolent planners.
I. Introduction
During the socialist calculation debate, Austrian critics of socialist economic planning (Mises 1920; Hayek 1935; Steele 1992) argued that planner inability to engage in economic calculation was sufficient to prove the undesirability of socialism. Since the system could not allocate resources efficiently, it was inherently undesirable; the benevolence or lack thereof on the part of the planning authority was irrelevant to the question at hand. No matter what the character of the planners, the economic calculation problem makes socialism less desirable. We wish here not to revisit the socialist calculation debate, but rather to turn the tables on its normative force. We argue that the calculation problem serves to augment the welfare of those living in socialist states precisely because of the self-interestedness of real-world economic planners (or other public agents).
1 Mises abstracts from motivational problems and assumes strictly benevolent planners. We grant that in such a world, planner inability to engage in economic calculation serves to reduce the welfare of those living in a socialist state. Without the assumption of benevolent public agents, however, planner inability to engage in economic calculation ceases to be a relevant argument against the desirability of economic planning.
Section II provides background on the benevolence assumption in the socialist calculation debate. In Section III, we suggest that economic calculation is simply unlikely to pose socially relevant problems: when agents are benevolent, recognition of the economic calculation problem causes them to abandon economic planning; when they are non-benevolent, economic calculation problems constrain their rapacity. The desirability of planner ability to engage in economic calculation, which we here term "calculative efficacy", hinges then on the nature of the planner. Consequently, we propose "calculative efficacy" as a complement to the notion of "cooperative efficacy" advanced by Cowen and Sutter (1999) . Section IV concludes.
II. Against a background of benevolence . . . Mises's (1920) argument concerning the undesirability of socialism rested on the grounds of its impracticability; specifically, even under the "best case" scenario of benevolent planners posited by proponents of socialist economic planning, their proposed system failed to deliver the promised goods. Market socialists of the 1930s characteristically supposed that planners could easily acquire all of the information requisite for the benevolent formulation of a first-best efficient plan. Dickinson (1939: 63) is typical:
On the basis of its experience with changing prices and quantities the statistical service of every sales agency would be able to draw up a demand schedule for each type of good sold . . . Under capitalism, demand schedules are apt to exist in the realm of faith rather than in that of works, but with the greater publicity and fuller statistics of the socialistic economy they would become much easier to draw up.
Mises argued that relaxing the assumption of "perfect information" on the part of the planners devastated the case for socialism.
Of course, a second line of argument existed for those arguing against the desirability of socialism: the planners could not be trusted to run such a system for anything but their own benefit. Indeed, such an argument provides a strong counterargument against those
